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Abstract. In a public key setting, Alice encrypts an email with the pub-
lic key of Bob, so that only Bob will be able to learn the contents of the
email. Consider a scenario where the computer of Alice is infected and
unbeknown to Alice it also embeds a malware into the message. Bob's
company, Carol, cannot scan his email for malicious content as it is en-
crypted so the burden is on Bob to do the scan. This is not ecient. We
construct a mechanism that enables Bob to provide trapdoors to Carol
such that Carol, given an encrypted data and a malware signature, is
able to check whether the encrypted data contains the malware signa-
ture, without decrypting it. We refer to this mechanism as public-key
encryption with delegated search (PKEDS).
We formalize PKEDS and give a construction based on ElGamal public-
key encryption (PKE). The proposed scheme has ciphertexts which are
both searchable and decryptable. This property of the scheme is crucial
since an entity can search the entire content of the message, in contrast
to existing searchable public-key encryption schemes where the search is
done only in the metadata part. We prove in the standard model that
the scheme is ciphertext indistinguishable and trapdoor indistinguishable
under the Symmetric External Die-Hellman (SXDH) assumption. We
prove also the ciphertext one-wayness of the scheme under the modied
Computational Die-Hellman (mCDH) assumption. We show that our
PKEDS scheme can be used in dierent applications such as detecting
encrypted malware and forwarding encrypted email.
1 Introduction
Consider an organization, Carol, whose employees use public-key encryption to
communicate with other users from outside the organization. All organizational
incoming encrypted emails are stored in a server which is managed by Carol. Bob
(an employee) can download his encrypted email from the server and decrypt
it locally using his private key. Encryption prevents an attacker from learning
condential information, but it opens another problem: the server cannot search
the ciphertext for malware. While encryption helps Bob to protect his sensitive
data, the hardness of processing the ciphertext without decrypting it, helps the
attacker to hide malicious content from the server. Suppose Alice, who resides
outside the organization, encrypts a message with the public key of Bob, so
that only Bob will be able to learn the contents of the message. Unbeknown to
Alice, her computer is infected and embeds malware into the message. Since the
malware is encrypted, the server is unable to scan the ciphertext for malicious
code. A naive solution to detect encrypted malware is for Bob to send his private
key to the server. Once the server gets the key, it decrypts the ciphertext and
then scans the plain data for a malicious content. However this solution is too
risky since the server accesses the plain data and a compromise of the server
compromises all Bob's data. Another solution would be to force Bob to scan his
email for malicious content. However this approach is not ecient.
In this paper we focus on nding mechanisms which allow the server to search
the ciphertext, without decrypting it. Searching encrypted data [BDCOP04] is
an attractive technique that might address the aforementioned problem. It al-
lows the server to search encrypted data without learning information about
the plain data or the search query. Boneh et al. [BDCOP04] were the rst to
propose public-key encryption with keyword search (a.k.a PEKS or searchable
encryption). It works as follows. Alice creates a ciphertext cw which encrypts
the keyword w and Bob creates a trapdoor tw for a keyword w. The trapdoor
tw is sent to the server, which on receipt of the searchable ciphertext cw and the
trapdoor tw, runs the Test function which returns true only if both the search-
able ciphertext cw and the trapdoor tw are associated with the same keyword,
otherwise it outputs false. PEKS, is only used to encrypt keywords (meta-data)
describing the document, while to encrypt the entire document Alice must use a
traditional public-key encryption PKE scheme, where the ciphertext is decrypt-
able but not searchable. This approach is not suitable for some applications,
such as detecting encrypted malware, for the following reasons: a) the server
can search only inside the PEKS ciphertext, the other part of the ciphertext
created by the PKE scheme is not searchable, and b) Bob has to stay online
- the malware signature database maintained by the server might get updated
frequently, therefore Bob has to create trapdoors and send them to the server.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper we construct a public-key encryption scheme with delegated search
(PKEDS) which has the following properties:
1. Each part of the encrypted data is both searchable and decryptable, unlike in
PEKS where only the metadata part of the ciphertext is searchable. Hence,
our scheme can be used alone, without employing an additional PKE scheme,
to provide end-to-end security.
2. Once delegated by Bob, the server is allowed to create any trapdoor without
contacting Bob, thus, once the delegation is done, Bob can go oine. We
construct a mechanism that enables Bob to provide the server with a master
trapdoor t such that, given the encrypted data and a word w picked by
the server, the server can test whether the word w is in the encrypted data,
without decrypting it.
3. The server can answer queries made by Bob. In the proposed scheme, Bob
can provide the server with a trapdoor tw associated with a specic word w
such that the server can test whether the word w occurs in the encrypted
data, without allowing the server to learn the word w.
We provide a security proof in the standard model and show that the scheme
is ciphertext indistinguishable and trapdoor indistinguishable under the Symmet-
ric External Die-Hellman (SXDH) assumption. Note that in our scheme it is
inherently impossible to achieve these properties against the server (i.e. we can
achieve these properties against any adversary excluding the server). The rst
limitation comes as a result of allowing the server to hold the master trapdoor
t, from which the server can create any trapdoor associated to any word and
break ciphertext indistinguishability security. The second limitation comes from
the nature of public-key encryption where an entity (i.e. the server) which holds
a trapdoor tw associated with a specic word w and knows the public key of the
receiver can create a valid ciphertext and break trapdoor indistinguishability.
This is also observed by Shen, Shi and Waters [SSW09] and to date the property
of trapdoor indistinguishability is only achieved in the symmetric key setting
where only the secret key holder can create a valid ciphertext. The best that we
can achieve against the server is ciphertext one-wayness and we show that our
scheme is secure in this respect under the modied Computation Die-Hellman
(mCDH) assumption in the standard model. The construction of the scheme is
based on ElGamal private-key encryption (PKE) [ElG85]. Indeed, our scheme
can be viewed as an extension of ElGamal, with additional features: it allows
the receiver to create trapdoors and the server to search the encrypted data.
The proposed construction uses Type-3 pairings [GPS08] which are employed
by the server to search the ciphertext and by the receiver to run the TrapGen
function in order to generate the trapdoor. The use of Type-3 pairing is crucial,
both for running testing functions and for preventing an adversary (other than
the server) to break the security of the scheme.
1.2 Related Work
In the public key setting, Boneh et al. [BDCOP04] introduced the rst private-
key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) in which everyone can create a
searchable ciphertext but only the owner of a private key can create a trapdoor.
The proposed PEKS scheme [BDCOP04] is based on anonymous identity-based
encryption (IBE) as introduced in [BF01]. Abdalla et al. [ABC+05] x a con-
sistency aw from [BDCOP04] and provide a transform of an anonymous IBE
scheme from Boyen and Waters [BW06] to construct a PEKS scheme in the
standard model. In addition, they show how to extend PEKS scheme to design
a private-key encryption with temporary keyword search.
There are number of improvements to the initial concept of PEKS in which
the search is only done by comparing the keyword of the ciphertext with the
keyword of the trapdoor. Boneh and Waters [BW07] propose a scheme which
supports conjunctive, subset, and range queries over the keywords. Hwang and
Lee [HL07] propose a PEKS scheme which works in the multiuser setting, where
the keyword is encrypted under many public keys for many receivers. Fuhr and
Paillier [FP07] propose a decryptable PEKS scheme with a security proof in
the heuristic random oracle model, and Hofeinz and Weinreb [HW08] propose a
decryptable PEKS scheme with a security proof in the standard model.
A similar concept to decryptable PEKS is the hybrid model [BSNS06,ZI07]
which integrates PKE and PEKS into a single scheme by allowing both schemes
to share the same key pair (pk; sk). The dierence between the hybrid model
and the original PEKS scheme, is that the rst integrates both PEKS and PKE
schemes into a single scheme, while the later assumes that in addition to PEKS
scheme there is an another separate PKE scheme. While the hybrid model ties
PEKS and PKE , it does not guarantee any relation between messages encrypted
under PEKS and messages encrypted under PKE scheme. Particularly, an at-
tacker can always encrypt one message using PEKS scheme and encrypt a dier-
ent message using PKE scheme, in this way causing the server to send emails in
which the receivers are not interested. The proposed PKEDS scheme guarantees
this relation since it allows the receiver to decrypt the searchable ciphertext and
check whether the keywords indeed describe the original message.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2 we give a brief description of bilinear
groups and complexity assumptions. In Section 3 we dene the algorithms of the
PKEDS scheme and formalize the security requirements. In Section 4 we present
our PKEDS construction. In Section 5 we prove its security and in Section 6 we
discuss its applications. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Bilinear Groups and Complexity Assumptions
Our construction uses prime order bilinear groups. Let G,   and GT be groups
of prime order p, and let g and  be generator of G and   , respectively. A pairing
(or bilinear map) e^ : G   ! GT has the following properties [BF01]:
1. Bilinearity: for all u 2 G, v 2   and a; b 2 Zp, we have e^(ua; vb) = e^(u; v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: e^(g; ) 6= 1.
3. The function e^ can be eciently computed.
Pairings can be categorized into three types [GPS08]: a) Type-1: is known as
symmetric pairing and G =   , b) Type-2: is known as asymmetric pairing and
G 6=   , but there is an eciently computable isomorphism  : G !   , and c)
Type-3: is same as Type-2 except that there is no known eciently computable
isomorphism  : G!   .
The ciphertext and trapdoor indistinguishability of the proposed scheme are
based on the Symmetric External Die-Hellman (SXDH).
Denition 1. Symmetric External Die-Hellman (SXDH ) Assump-
tion: In Type-3 pairings the Decision Die-Hellman Problem (DDH) is in-
tractable both in G and   , i.e. given a tuple (g; ga; gb; gc) 2 G or (; a; b; c) 2
  with a; b 2 Zp, decide whether c = ab or c 2R Zp.
To prove the one-wayness of the scheme, we use a slightly stronger variant of
the CDH assumption which we call it the modied CDH (mCDH).
Denition 2. Modied Computational Die-Hellman (mCDH) Assump-
tion: Given tuples (g; ga; gb) 2 G and (; b) 2   with a; b 2 Zp, it is hard to
compute gab.
Note that the mCDH assumption is implied by the BDH-3 [CM09] assumption.
Therefore, an algorithm that breaks the mCDH assumption can be converted to
an algorithm that breaks the BDH-3 assumption.
3 Description and Security Model of PKEDS Scheme
Denition 3. A private-key encryption scheme with delegated search (PKEDS)
consists of the following nine algorithms (Setup, KeyGenS, KeyGenR, Encrypt,
Delegate, TrapGen, Test1, Test2, Decrypt):
{ Setup() : The setup algorithm is run by a system administrator and takes
as input a security parameter  and outputs public parameters PP.
{ KeyGenS(PP) : This key generation algorithm is run by the server and takes
as input public parameters PP and outputs the server's public/private key
pair (pkS ; skS).
{ KeyGenR(PP) : This key generation algorithm is run by Bob (the receiver)
and takes as input public parameters PP and outputs Bob's public/private
key pair (pkR; skR).
{ Encrypt(pkR; w) : The encryption algorithm is run by Alice (the message
sender) and takes as input Bob's public key pkR and a word w, and outputs
a ciphertext cw.
{ Delegate(skR; pkS) : The delegate algorithm is run by Bob and takes as input
Bob's private key skR, the server's public key pkS, and outputs the master
trapdoor t.
{ TrapGen(skR; pkS ; w) : The trapdoor generation algorithm is run by Bob and
takes as input Bob's private key skR, the server's public key pkS and a word
w, and outputs the trapdoor tw.
{ Test1(cw; t; tw; skS) : The rst testing algorithm is run by the server and
takes as input a ciphertext cw, a master trapdoor t, a trapdoor tw associated
with the word w, and the server's private key skS, and outputs true if the
ciphertext and the trapdoor are associated with the same word, otherwise
outputs ?.
{ Test2(cw; t; w; skS) : The second testing algorithm is run by the server and
takes as input a ciphertext cw, a master trapdoor t, a word w, and the
server's private key skS, and outputs true if the ciphertext contains the word
w, otherwise outputs ?.
{ Decrypt(cw; skR) : The decryption algorithm is run by Bob and takes as input
a ciphertext cw and Bob's private key skR, and outputs the word w or ? if
cw is invalid.
Correctness. We say that PKEDS is correct if for all security parameters
 2 N, for all server public/private key pairs produced by KeyGenS , for all
receiver public/private key pairs produced by KeyGenR, for all ciphertexts cw
produced by Encrypt, for all master trapdoors t produced by Delegate and for
all trapdoors tw produced by TrapGen , we should have:
Pr
2664
PP  Setup(); (pkS ; skS) KeyGenS(PP); (pkR; skR) KeyGenR(PP);
cw  Encrypt(pkR; w); t  Delegate(skR; pkS); tw  TrapGen(skR; pkS ; w) :
w  Decrypt(cw; skR) ^ true Test1(cw; t; tw; skS)
^ true Test2(cw; t; w; skS)
3775 = 1
Ciphertext Indistinguishability. In the following we describe the basic secu-
rity property for a PKEDS scheme which is ciphertext indistinguishability. This
property guarantees that it is infeasible for an adversary (other than the server)
to learn any information about any word from the ciphertext. The following
denition formally captures this property.
Denition 4. (CI-ATK) Let PKEDS be a private-key encryption with dele-
gated search scheme and let A be a polynomial-time (PPT) adversary. Let
ADVCI ATKA;PKEDS()
def
= Pr
2664
PP  Setup(); (pkS ; skS) KeyGenS(PP);
(w0; w1; R
) AO1;O2;O3(pkS ;PP); v  f0; 1g;
cwv  Encrypt(pkR ; wv);
v0  AO1;O2;O3(cwv ; w0; w1; pkR ; pkS) : v0 = v
3775  12
where w0 6= w1 ^ jw0j = jw1j , the key-generation oracle O1(R) is dened as
KeyGenR(PP) and returns (pkR; skR) , the registration oracle O2(R) is dened
as Delegate(skR; pkS) and returns t, the trapdoor generation oracle O3(R;w) is
dened as TrapGen(skR; w) and returns tw. We restrict A such that if A queries
O1 for the receiver key pair R, then O1 returns only the public key pkR of
the receiver R. We say that PKEDS is secure from ciphertext indistinguishable
attacks if ADVCI ATKA;PKEDS is negligible for any A.
The scheme does not achieve CI against the server. Given the challenge
ciphertext cwb , the master trapdoor t and words (w0, w1), the server runs
Test2(cwb ; t; w0; skS) to check whether the trapdoor and the ciphertext are
associated with the same word. If the output of Test2 is true then the server
learns that b = 0, otherwise it learns that b = 1. As CI against the server
is inherently not possible (remember that our focus is to allow the server to
search the ciphertext); the best we can achieve against the server is ciphertext
one-wayness.
Note. The security model that we consider in this paper is weaker than the
original security model considered in PEKS [BDCOP04]. Our model gives more
power to the server since the scheme allows the server to generate any trapdoor.
This is risky for low entropy messages since the server by trial and error can nd
out the message. Nevertheless, for high entropy messages this attack is hard. For
instance, if the server scans a ciphertext which contains user ngerprints, then
its hard for the server to guess the ngerprint and run the trial and error attack.
Indeed, our scheme is suitable for situations when the server is managed by an
organization which wants to protect their employees from potential malicious
senders while avoiding the need of giving the private key to the server.
Trapdoor Indistinguishability. The trapdoor indistinguishability property
guarantees that it is infeasible for an adversary (except the server) to learn any
information about any word from the trapdoor. Baek et al. [BSNS08] observe
that PEKS scheme presented by Boneh et al. [BDCOP04] assumes a secure
channel between the server and the receiver. If there is no secure channel, then
everyone can break the trapdoor indistinguishability property since everyone can
play the role of the server. To remove the secure channel between the receiver
and the server, Baek et al. [BSNS08] propose a scheme where the sender en-
crypts the PEKS ciphertext with the public key of the server, in such a way
that only the server who knows the private key can reveal the PEKS ciphertext.
In this paper we take a dierent approach to achieve trapdoor indistinguishabil-
ity against outside adversaries. The Baek et al. [BSNS08] solution is not suitable
in our setting since we allow the receiver to decrypt the PKEDS ciphertext, oth-
erwise if we encrypt the PKEDS ciphertext with the server's public key, then
the receiver cannot decrypt the ciphertext without getting help from the server.
Instead, the role of the server is to search the encrypted data and not to help
the receiver to decrypt the ciphertext. To achieve trapdoor indistinguishability,
we need the secure channel established between the receiver and the server, as
assumed in [BDCOP04]. This implies that, instead of encrypting the commu-
nication between the sender and the receiver, we encrypt the communication
between the receiver and the server. Namely, before sending the trapdoor to the
server, the receiver encrypts the trapdoor under the server's public key. Since
only the server has the private key, only the server can reveal the trapdoor and
search the encrypted data. We capture the property of trapdoor indistinguisha-
bility through the following denition.
Denition 5. (TI-ATK) Let PKEDS be a private-key encryption with dele-
gated search scheme and let A be a polynomial-time (PPT) adversary. Let
ADVT I ATKA;PKEDS()
def
= Pr
2664
PP  Setup(); (pkS ; skS) KeyGenS(PP);
(w0; w1; R
) AO1;O2;O3(pkS ;PP); v  f0; 1g;
twv  TrapGen(pkR ; wv);
v0  AO1;O2;O3(twv ; w0; w1; pkR ; pkS) : v0 = v
3775  12
where w0 6= w1 ^ jw0j = jw1j and oracles O1;O2;O3 are dened in the same way
as in CI   ATK, but the dierence is that the adversary is not limited in his
queries. We say that PKEDS is secure from trapdoor indistinguishable attacks
if ADVT I ATKA;PKEDS is negligible for any A.
Under this denition we achieve T I only for adversaries other than the server.
Informally speaking, we achieve this property by not allowing an adversary to
search the encrypted data. In particular, we cannot achieve T I from the server
who runs the Test1 function since the server can guess the word in the following
way: the server sends to the challenger two words (w0, w1) and the challenger
replies to the server by sending twv for a random bit v 2 f0; 1g. Next, the server
chooses a random bit v0 2 f0; 1g and runs cv0  Encrypt(pkR; wv0). Finally, the
server run Test1(cv0 ; t; twv ; skS) and outputs v
0 = v if the output of Test1 is
true.
Ciphertext One-Wayness. The property of ciphertext one-wayness guaran-
tees that it is hard for an adversary to invert the ciphertext and to learn the
word even if the adversary holds the server's private key, the master trapdoor
and the trapdoor associated with that word, but the adversary does not hold
the receiver's private key. The following denition formally captures this attack.
Denition 6. (COW-ATK) Let PKEDS be a private-key encryption with del-
egated search scheme and let A be a polynomial-time (PPT) adversary. Let
ADVCOW ATKA;PKEDS ()
def
= Pr
2664
PP  Setup(); (pkS ; skS) KeyGenS(PP);
R  AO1;O2;O3(pkS ; skS ;PP); w  M(k);
cw  Encrypt(pkR ; w); tw  Encrypt(skR ; pkS ; w);
w0  AO1;O2;O3(cw ; tw ; pkR ; skS ; pkS) : w0 = w
3775
where oracles O1;O2;O3 are dened in the same way as in CI  ATK with the
restriction that A is not allowed to learn skR from the oracle O1. We say that
PKEDS is secure from ciphertext one-way attacks if ADVCOW ATKA;PKEDS is negligible
for any A.
4 A Construction of PKEDS Scheme
We are now ready to present our construction. When explaining the scheme we
consider the single-user setting. The scheme consists of nine algorithms (Setup,
KeyGenS , KeyGenR, Encrypt, Delegate, TrapGen, Test1, Test2, Decrypt) dened as
follows:
Setup: On input of the security parameter  the algorithm outputs public pa-
rameters (PP) which contain the description of groups < G;   > of order p,
the bilinear map e^ : G    ! GT , generators g and  of groups G and   ,
respectively.
KeyGenS(PP): On input of public parameters PP the algorithm picks a random
x 2 Zp and outputs the server's key pair:
(skS ; pkS) = (x; ps = 
x)
KeyGenR(PP): On input of public parameters PP the algorithm picks a random
; y 2 Zp and outputs the receiver's key pair:
(skR; pkR) = ((y; 
); pr = g
y)
Encrypt(pkR; w): On input of the receiver's public key and a word w 2 G the
algorithm picks a random k 2 Zp and outputs the ElGamal ciphertext:
cw = (c1; c2) =
 
w  pkr ; gk

Delegate(pkS ; skR): The algorithm creates a master trapdoor to allow the server
to search the encrypted data for any word of his choice. The algorithm picks
at random r1; r2 2 Zp and outputs the master trapdoor:
t = (t1; t2; t3; t4) = (  pr1s ; r1 ; y  pr2s ; r2)
TrapGen(skR; pkS ; w): The algorithm creates a trapdoor to allow the server to
search for a specic message w. The algorithm picks a random  2 Zp and
outputs the trapdoor:
tw = (t5; t6) =
 
e^(w; )  e^(pr; ps); 

Test1(cw; t; tw; skS) : The algorithm tests whether the ciphertext contains the
same message as the trapdoor. The algorithm parses cw as (c1; c2), t as
(t1; t2; t3; t4), tw as (t5; t6) and denes:
t7 =
t1
tx2
; t8 =
t3
tx4
; ~a =
e^(pr; t
x
6)  e^(c1; t7)
t5
; ~b = e^(c2; t8):
Finally, the algorithm checks whether ~a
?
= ~b. If this equation holds, the
algorithm outputs true indicating that the ciphertext contains the same
message as the trapdoor, otherwise it outputs false.
Test2(cw; t; w; skS) : The algorithm tests whether the ciphertext contains the
word w. The algorithm parse cw as (c1; c2), t as (t1; t2; t3; t4) and denes:
t7 =
t1
tx2
; t8 =
t3
tx4
; ~c = e^(c1; t7) ; ~d = e^(c2; t8)
Finally, the algorithm checks whether ~c~d
?
= e^(w; t7). If this equation holds,
the algorithm outputs true indicating that the ciphertext contains the word
w, otherwise it outputs false.
Decrypt(skR; cw): On input of the ciphertext and the private key the algorithm
outputs:
w =
c1
cy2
:
4.1 Eciency
In Table 1 we count the number of calculations in KeyGenS , KeyGenR, Encrypt,
Delegate, TrapGen, Test1, Test2 and Decrypt. KeyGenS requires one exponentia-
tion in   and KeyGenR requires one exponentiation in G and one exponentiation
in   . Encrypt and Decrypt are same as in ElGamal. Encrypt requires two exponen-
tiations in G which are independent of the message and can be computed ahead
of time and Decrypt requires only one exponentiation in G. Delegate requires ve
exponentiations in   . TrapGen requires one exponentiation in   , one exponen-
tiation in GT and two pairing operations. Test1 requires two exponentiations in
  , one exponentiation in GT and three pairing operations. Test2 requires two
exponentiations in   and three pairing operations.
5 Security
We now show that the scheme satises the correctness property, and is cipher-
text indistinguishable, trapdoor indistinguishable and that the scheme oers
ciphertext one-wayness.
Exp.(G) Exp.(  ) Exp.(GT ) Pairing
KeyGenS // 1 // //
KeyGenR 1 1 // //
Encrypt 2 // // //
Delegate // 5 // //
TrapGen // 1 1 2
Test1 // 2 1 3
Test2 // 2 // 3
Decrypt 1 // // //
Table 1. Eciency of PKEDS
Correctness. Firstly, we show that when a ciphertext is created as a result of
running Encrypt on input of the word w and the receiver's public key pkR, then
the same word w is revealed when running Decrypt on input of the ciphertext
and the receiver's private key skR. This proof is ElGamal encryption/decyption
and proceeds as follows:
c1
cy2
=
w  pkr
grs
=
w  grs
grs
= w
Next, we show the correctness for Test1 algorithm. We observe that:
t7 =
  pr1s
xr1
=  t8 =
y  pr2s
xr2
= y
~a =
e^(pr; 
x)  e^(w  pkr ; )
e^(w; )  e^(pr; ps)
= e^(pkr ; 
) ~b = e^(gk; y) = e^(pkr ; 
)
Thus ~a = ~b and the output is true indicating that the word associated with
the ciphertext and the word associated with the trapdoor are the same. Finally,
we show the correctness for the Test2 algorithm. We observe that:
t7 =
  pr1s
xr1
=  t8 =
y  pr2s
xr2
= y ~c = e^(w  pkr ; )
~d = e^(gk; y)
~c
~d
= e^(w; )
Thus ~c~d = e^(w; t7) and the output is true indicating that the ciphertext is an
encryption of the word w.
Ciphertext Indistinguishability. When proving this property we will closely
follow the security proof of [BGMM05]. In the following we show that our con-
struction is CI-ATK secure as long as the SXDH assumption holds.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists an adversary A that can break the CI-
ATK of the PKEDS scheme with advantage ". Then we can construct a reduction
B that breaks the SXDH assumption with advantage (1   qn ) 1n "2 where q is the
number of queries asked by A, and n is the number of receivers in the system.
Proof. The challenger selects a bilinear map e^ : G    ! GT , and generators
g and  of groups G and   , respectively. Then, it picks at random a; b 2 Zp,
computes T0 = g
ab and picks at random T1 2R G. It ips a fair coin  2R f0; 1g
and gives the SXDH tuple (g; ga; gb; T) 2 G to the reduction B. The goal of B
is to solve the SXDH assumption and acts as A's challenger as follows:
1. Setup : B generates the server's key pair (skS ; pkS) = (x; ps = x), where
x 2R Zp is chosen in the same way as in the scheme. B publishes PP and
the server's key pair. The distribution of the PP and the server's key pair
is identical to the PP and the server's key pair of the scheme since g and 
are random generators, and x is a random exponent, all chosen in the same
way as in the scheme.
2. KeyGenR to O1 : B answers the receiver's key generation queries by comput-
ing (skR; pkR) = ((y; 
); pr = g
y) where ; y 2R Zp are chosen in the same
way as in the scheme (each user has dierent  and y value). If the query is
for R, B sets the public key equal to pr = ga (this parameter is taken from
the SXDH instance). Note that B does not know the private key of R (B
does not know a). The distribution of the receiver's key pair is identical to
the distribution of the receiver's key pair of the scheme since g is a random
generator, , a and y are random exponents, all chosen in the same way as
in the scheme.
3. Delegate Query to O2 : A requests a master trapdoor for the receiver R. If R
is equal to R, B aborts the simulation and returns a guess 0. Otherwise, if R
is not equal to R, B computes the random elements r1; r2 2 Zp and outputs
the master trapdoor t = (t1; t2; t3; t4) = (  pr1s ; r1 ; y  pr2s ; r2). When
B does not abort, the distribution of the master trapdoor is identical to the
distribution of the master trapdoor in the scheme since r1 and r2 are random
elements from Zp, same as in the real scheme.
4. TrapGen Query to O3 : A requests a trapdoor for the pair (R;w) 1. If R is
equal to R, B aborts the simulation and returns a guess 0. Otherwise, if
R is not equal to R, B picks random  2 Zp and outputs the trapdoor
tw = (t5; t6) =
 
e^(w; )  e^(pr; ps); 

.
When B does not abort, the distribution of the trapdoor is identical to the
distribution of trapdoor in the scheme since  is chosen at random from Zp,
same as in the real scheme.
5. Challenge : A requests a ciphertext for one of the two words w0 and w1
generated under the public key of the receiver R. If R is equal to R, B
ips a fair binary coin v 2 f0; 1g and outputs the ciphertext c^wv = (c1; c2) =
(wv T; gb), where gb and T are parameters taken from SXDH instance. The
distribution of the ciphertext is identical to the distribution of the ciphertext
in the scheme only if T = g
ab. Otherwise, if T 2R G, the ciphertext is a
random element from G. If R is not equal to R, B aborts the simulation
and returns a guess 0.
1 A trapdoor associated with the word w generated by user (receiver) R.
6. Guess : At the end of the game, without loss of generality, we assume that A
has ciphertexts for all keywords generated by each user, and has requested
trapdoor queries to oracles O2 and O3 generated from all but one user.
Therefore, we assume that at the end of the game, in a non-aborted simula-
tion case, A should have ciphertexts generated by all users for each keyword,
and have at least one challenge ciphertext, denoted as c^v , which is either a
valid or invalid ciphertext generated by R for which A does not have the
corresponding trapdoor. Lastly, A outputs a guess v0. If the guess is correct
v0 = v, then B sets 0 = 0 indicating that T0 = gab, otherwise B sets 0 = 1
indicating that T1 2R G.
Suppose B does not abort (noted as abort) during the simulation. If  = 0
then the ciphertext c^v is a valid ciphertext generated by user R
 and A sees
an encryption of wv. In this case we have: Pr

v0 = vjabort ^  = 0 = 12 + ".
If  = 1 then the ciphertext c^v is random ciphertext for A (i.e. A gains no
information about wv). Hence we have: Pr

v0 6= vjabort ^  = 1 = 12 . Note
that the advantage of B is same as the advantage of A. For the rst case
when the guess of A is correct v0 = v, B will output 0 = 0 and we have
Pr

0 = jabort ^  = 0 = 12 + ". For the second case when the guess is not
correct v0 6= v, B will output 0 = 1 and we have Pr 0 = jabort ^  = 1 = 12 .
Now assume that B aborts (noted as abort) the simulation when running
either TrapGen Query or Challenge phase. In this case B outputs its guess 0
which is independent of the guess given by A in Guess phase. Therefore the
advantage of B in the abort case is: Pr [0 = jabort] = 12 . Putting all together
we dene the overall advantage of the reduction B:
Pr[abort] Pr [0 = jabort] + Pr[abort](Pr[ = 0]Pr[0 = jabort ^  = 0] +
Pr[ = 1]Pr[0 = jabort ^  = 1])  1
2
=
Pr[abort]"
2
:
Now we have to dene exactly the value of Pr[abort] and give the exact overall
advantage of B. Let assume thatAmakes at most q queries during TrapGen Query
phase and there are n users in the system. Since there is only one user for whom
B cannot answer in TrapGen Query phase, the probability that a query causes B
to abort is at most 1n . Since A can make q queries the overall probability that A
aborts during TrapGen Query phase is qn . Thus the probability that B does not
abort in the TrapGen Query is 1   qn . The probability that B will not abort in
the Challenge phase is at least 1n . We now conclude that the reduction B solves
the SXDH assumption with advantage at least (1  qn ) 1n "2 , as required. 2
Trapdoor Indistinguishability. We prove that our scheme is TI-ATK secure
as long as the SXDH assumption is intractable. Unlike the ciphertext indistin-
guishability where the reduction had an SXDH instance from the group G, when
proving this property the reduction has an SXDH instance from the group   .
Theorem 2. Suppose that there exists an adversary A that can break the trap-
door indistinguishability of the PKEDS scheme with advantage ". Then we can
construct a reduction B that solves the SXDH assumption with advantage "2 .
Proof. The challenger selects a bilinear map e^ : G   ! GT , and generators g
and  of groups G and   , respectively. Next, the challenger denes T0 = ab for
a random a; b 2R Zp and picks at random T1 2R   . After ipping a fair coin
 2R f0; 1g, the challenger gives the SXDH tuple (; a; b; T) 2   to B. The
reduction B solves the SXDH assumption by running A as a subroutine:
1. Setup: B sets the server's public key pkS = (ps = a), where a is taken from
the SXDH instance, and implicitly sets the server's secret-key skS = a. The
reduction publishes the PP and the server's public keys which distribution
is identical to the PP and the server's public keys of the scheme since g and
 are random generators, a is random exponent, all chosen in the same way
as in the scheme.
2. KeyGenR to O1 : B answers receiver's key generation queries by computing
(skR; pkR) = ((y; 
); pr = g
y) where ; y 2R Zp are chosen in the same way
as in the scheme (each user has dierent  and y value). The distribution
of receiver's key pair is identical to the distribution of receiver's key pair of
the scheme since g is a random generator,  and y are random exponents,
all chosen in the same way as in the scheme.
3. Delegate Query to O2 : A requests a master trapdoor for the receiver R.
B compute random elements r1; r2 2 Zp and outputs the master trapdoor
t = (t1; t2; t3; t4) = (  pr1s ; r1 ; y pr2s ; r2).
The distribution of the master trapdoor is identical to the distribution of the
master trapdoor in the scheme since r1 and r2 are random elements from
Zp, same as in the real scheme.
4. TrapGen Query to O3 : A requests a trapdoor for the pair (R;w). B picks
random  2 Zp and outputs the trapdoor tw associated with the keyword w,
tw = (t5; t6) =
 
e^(w; )  e^(pr; ps); 

. The distribution of the trapdoor is
identical to the distribution of the trapdoor in the scheme since  is randomly
chosen from Zp, same as in the real scheme.
5. Challenge : A sends two words w0 and w1 to B and asks for a trapdoor
generated by user R. B ips a fair coin v 2R f0; 1g, picks at random  2 Zp
and implicitly sets  = b (where b is an exponent from the SXDH instance)
and returns the trapdoor to A: twv = (t5; t6) =
 
e^(wv; 
)  e^(pr; T); b

,
where (pr = g
y, y) is R's public/private key pair.
6. Guess : A outputs a guess v0.
If  = 0 and T = 
ab, then the generated challenged trapdoor twv is
a valid trapdoor generated by user R and the view of A is distributed as
if it had received the trapdoor from the real scheme. In this case we have:
Pr [v0 = vj = 0] = 12 + ". If  = 1 and T 2R   , then the generated trap-
door twv is an invalid trapdoor. In this case we have: Pr [v
0 6= vj = 1] = 12 .
Putting all together we dene the overall advantage of B:
(Pr[ = 0]Pr[0 = j = 0]+Pr[ = 1]Pr[0 = j = 1]) 1
2
=
"
2
: 2
Ciphertext One-Wayness. In this section we show that our construction is
COW-ATK secure in the standard model.
Theorem 3. The PKEDS scheme with the message space in G is COW ATK
secure in the standard model assuming mCDH is intractable.
Proof. The challenger selects a bilinear map e^ : G   ! GT , and generators g
and  of groups G and   , respectively. Then, it picks at random a; b 2 Zp, and
gives mCDH tuples (g; ga; gb) 2 G and (; b) 2   to the reduction B. The goal
of B is to solve the mCDH assumption and acts as A's challenger as follows:
1. Setup : B generates the server's key pair (skS ; pkS) = (x; ps = x), where
x 2R Zp is chosen in the same way as in the scheme. B publishes PP and
the server's key pair. The distribution of the PP and the server's key pair
is identical to the PP and the server's key pair of the scheme since g and 
are random generators, and x is a random exponent, all chosen in the same
way as in the scheme.
2. KeyGenR to O1 : B answers receiver's key generation queries by computing
(skR; pkR) = ((y; 
); pr = g
y) where ; y 2R Zp are chosen in the same
way as in the scheme (each user has dierent  and y value). If the query
is for R, B sets the public key equal to pr = ga (this parameter is taken
from the mCDH instance). Note that B does not know the private key of R
(the reduction does not know a). The distribution of receiver's key pair is
identical to the distribution of receiver's key pair of the scheme since g is a
random generator, , a and y are random exponents, all chosen in the same
way as in the scheme.
3. Delegate Query to O2 : A requests a master trapdoor for the receiver R. B
computes random elements r1; r2 2 Zp and outputs the master trapdoor
t = (t1; t2; t3; t4) = (  pr1s ; r1 ; y pr2s ; r2). If R = R then y = a. The
distribution of the master trapdoor is identical to the distribution of the
master trapdoor in the scheme since r1 and r2 are random elements from
Zp, same as in the real scheme.
4. TrapGen Query to O3 : A requests a trapdoor for the pair (R;w). B picks ran-
dom  2 Zp and outputs the trapdoor tw = (t5; t6) = (e^(w; ) e^(pr; ps); ).
The distribution of the trapdoor is identical to the distribution of trapdoor
in the scheme since  is chosen at random from Zp, same as in the real
scheme.
5. Challenge : The reduction picks at random c0 2 Zp, computes g
c0
ga = g
c
(thus, c0 = a + c), implicitly sets w = gbc and outputs the challenge
ciphertext c^w = (c1; c2) = (g
bc0 ; gb) and the challenge trapdoor tw =
(t5; t6) = (e^(g
c; b)e^(pr; ps); ) . The challenge ciphertext c^w = (c1; c2) =
(gbc
0
; gb) = (gbc  gab; gb) is a valid encryption of the message w = gbc under
the public key of R and has the same distribution as the ciphertext in the
real scheme. The same holds for the trapdoor tw .
6. Output : At the end of the game, A outputs the message w0.
B checks whether e^(w0; ) ?= e^(ga; b). If so, then A has decrypted the challenge
ciphertext and B uses the output of A to solve the mCDH assumption: gab = c1w0 ,
which will reach a contradiction and proof the theorem. 2
6 Applications
In this section we illustrate two applications of the PKEDS scheme: to detect
encrypted malwares and to forward encrypted emails.
Detecting Encrypted Malware. A polymorphic virus uses encryption to
modify its form as it spreads in such a way that dierent infected les have
dierent byte-strings (each le is encrypted with a dierent key) [MC00]. The
polymorphic virus instance is divided into three parts: the decryption algorithm,
the decryption key and the encrypted virus. The decryption algorithm uses the
decryption key in order to decrypt and run the virus. The fact that polymor-
phic viruses store the decryption key within each virus instance, makes them
detectable by a virus scanner. As pointed out in the introduction, in this pa-
per we consider attackers who use encryption to hide malware even in a more
powerful way. Namely, in our attack scenario an attacker does not include the
decryption key within the encrypted data, indeed an attacker does not know the
decryption key which belongs to the receiver. Hence, the virus instance that we
consider contains only the encrypted malware and the decryption algorithm.
In the proposed PKEDS, the server can use the master trapdoor, a ciphertext
and a malware signature, to check whether the ciphertext contains the malware
signature, without decrypting it. This kind of detection is known as signature-
based detection and is performed by most existing antivirus software packages,
which maintain a database with known malware signatures and check whether
the scanned data has the same signature as one of the signatures stored in the
database. If the signatures match, then a malware is found and the antivirus
takes further steps to quarantine, repair or delete the data. In our context we
assume that the server has a database with known malware signatures and for
each signature, using the master trapdoor t, it creates a trapdoor and checks
whether the trapdoor and the scanned ciphertext have the same signature. If so,
then a malware is detected and the server takes further steps to quarantine or
delete the ciphertext, otherwise the ciphertext is clean and is forwarded to the
receiver. The crucial property of the scheme is that ciphertexts are both search-
able and decryptable, thus the server can search every part of the ciphertext for
a possible malware. Note that allowing the server to search the encrypted data
does not mean that the server can perform any kind of intrusion detection. For
instance, 0-day attacks cannot be detected through signature-based detection.
Roschke et al. [RICM10] propose a technique which detects malicious content
in the encrypted data. The solution presented in [RICM10] is based on the IBE
[BF01] scheme and suers from the key escrow property where the compromise of
the master secret key compromises the whole system. The conceptual dierence
between our approach and the approach presented in [RICM10], is that the
technique in [RICM10] uses the master secret key of the IBE to decrypt the
ciphertext and then uses the virus scanner to scan the plaintext, while in our
approach scanning can be done in the encrypted data, without having to decrypt
it.
Forwarding Encrypted Emails. The original motivation for a PEKS scheme
is to allow an email server to categorize user encrypted emails based on keywords
contained in the message text. Using this property, Bob can create trapdoors
twork and tfamily, and instruct the server to forward his encrypted emails tagged
with the word \work" to his secretary and encrypted emails tagged with the
word \family" to one of his family members. Waters et al. [WBDS04] showed
that PEKS schemes can also be used to build an searchable audit log which
is encrypted. The PKEDS scheme adds the decryption property to the PEKS
scheme and as such can be used in every application that PEKS can be used. The
PKEDS scheme has the following additional advantages compared to PEKS:
{ PKEDS can be used alone, without employing an additional PKE encryption
scheme, to send encrypted messages in an open environment. This property
inherently brings an additional advantage - each word of the message be-
comes searchable by the server. For instance, to encrypt a message m with
consists from words w1; :::; wk, the sender generates the ciphertext:
(EncryptPKEDS(w1)jj:::jjEncryptPKEDS(wk))
Where EncryptPKEDS is the encryption algorithm for the PKEDS scheme.
It is clear that to reveal the message m, the receiver has to decrypt each
searchable ciphertext separately. From the computational point of view, us-
ing PKEDS alone might be expensive since it requires a number of PKEDS
ciphertexts linear in the number of words in the document. Note that in
PEKS the server can search only for keywords and this might be a problem
for scenarios when the original message might contain some words that ap-
pear in the receiver's query but do not appear in the keyword list, and as a
result the server will not forward these documents to the receiver.
{ PKEDS can be used in the same way as PEKS is used, namely, use PKEDS
to encrypt only keywords in addition to a non-searchable PKE scheme which
encrypts the original message. For instance, to encrypt a message m with
keywords w1; :::; wk, the sender generates the ciphertext:
(EncryptPKE(m)jjEncryptPKEDS(w1)jj:::jjEncryptPKEDS(wk))
Where EncryptPKE is a regular encryption function for the PKE scheme and
EncryptPKEDS is the encryption function for the PKEDS scheme. Unlike
PEKS which does not guarantee any relation between keywords (encrypted
under PEKS) and the original message (encrypted under PKE), PKEDS
guarantees this relation since it allows the receiver to decrypt the search-
able ciphertext and check whether the keywords indeed describe the original
message. Another benet is that the receiver can categorize her messages
according to keywords, unlike in PEKS where the receiver cannot categorize
her messages since the searchable ciphertext is not decryptable and conse-
quently the receiver, without decrypting the ciphertext, does not know which
keywords describe the message. From the computational point of view, us-
ing PKEDS in addition to another PKE scheme would require a number of
PKEDS ciphertexts linear in the number of keywords in the message, same
as in PEKS.
7 Conclusion
In this work we have presented a private-key encryption with delegated search
(PKEDS) with a security proof in the standard model. In the proposed scheme
the private key holder creates a master trapdoor t and delegates to another
entity (i.e. the server) the ability to search ciphertexts intended for the receiver
without decrypting it. The main property of the scheme is that ciphertexts are
both searchable and decryptable, thus the scheme can be used to search not
only for keywords describing the document, but search also for words inside the
document. The proposed scheme also allows the receiver to provide the server
with a special key (a.k.a. trapdoor tw) associated with a specic word w, such
that it enables the server to test whether the word w is in the ciphertext. As an
application, we show how PKEDS can be used for detecting encrypted malware
and for forwarding encrypted email.
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